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Counterfactual approach for assessing agri-environmental 
policy: The case of the Finnish water protection policy  
Lankoski J. and Ollikainen M.  
 
Abstract 
This  paper  applies  counterfactual  approach  to  assess  the  impacts  of  agri-environmental 
programs. Counterfactual analysis evaluates policies answering questions: what would have 
happened if...? We develop a theoretical framework for counterfactual analysis based on the 
inter-linkages between the behaviour of agents and the response of environmental systems to the 
economic  decisions.  We  apply  our  model  to  assess  the  performance  of  the  Finnish  Agri-
Environmental  Programme  to  reduce  agricultural  nutrient  runoff  to  the  Baltic  Sea. 
Counterfactual  analysis  allows  us  to  determine  both  the  unit  effectiveness  of  the  measures 
included in the Programme and its preventive impact. We demonstrate that the Finnish Agri-
Environmental Programme does not achieve its goals, because it fails to anticipate farmers’ 
responses to incentives created by the Common Agricultural Policy and the Agri-Environmental 
Programme itself. The social cost-benefit analysis of the Program shows negative net benefits: 
benefits from reduced nutrient loading are much lower than support payments. 
 
Keywords: environmental policy evaluation, counterfactual analysis, nutrient runoff, the Baltic 
Sea  
 
JEL classification: Q5, H23, H43.  
1.  INTRODUCTION  
Common  agricultural  policy  (CAP)  of  the  EU  includes  a  possibility  for  voluntary 
environmental protection programs in agriculture. The programs provide an incentive payment 
for compensating the compliance costs and farmers’ private transaction costs. In many countries 
these voluntary programs entail significant monetary transfers from tax payers to farmers. Thus, 
it is important to assess the success of these voluntary agri-environmental programs. As is well-
known, it is a challenging task to assess any program, save a case where environmental effects 
are deeply involved. One method for assessing environmental policies is to contrast them with 
alternative, hypothetical policies or states of affairs and thereby reveal the impacts of policies, 
that is, to resort counterfactual analysis. Counterfactual analysis belongs to the basic tools for 
policy evaluation in economics. Counterfactual analysis answers the question: what would have 
happened if…? Counterfactual analysis builds on a non-observable case, called counterfactual, 
against which policies can be evaluated. A comparison of the counterfactual with the actual case 
sheds light to the critical factors explaining the impacts of policy.  
In  this  paper  we  suggest  a  formal  approach  to  counterfactual  analysis  based  on 
behavioural assumptions, that is, the profit maximization hypothesis of farmers. The farmers 
maximize profits both in the presence and absence of policy. The choices over the use of inputs 
and  land  allocation  between  crops can then be linked  to nutrient  runoff  and other  relevant Ancona - 122
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environmental process functions to predict the environmental outcomes of different policies that 
can then be contrasted to the goals and measured outcomes of agri-environmental policies. 
We develop a theoretical frame and derive the counterfactuals for empirical analysis from 
it. We apply our theoretical frame to agricultural water protection policy which aims at reducing 
nutrient runoff from arable lands to the Baltic Sea. In Finland, like in all Baltic Sea countries, 
agriculture is the main source of nitrogen and phosphorus loads (60% of the anthropogenic 
phosphorus and 52% of nitrogen loads) to the Sea (HELCOM 2010). Given that nutrient loads 
from point sources have been reduced considerably, pressure to reduce loads from agriculture is 
high  and  agri-environmental  program  tries  to  cope  with  this  challenge.  The  first  Agri-
Environmental  Programme  was  for  1995-1999.  Although  the  program  addressed  many 
environmental issues (water quality, air quality, biodiversity, and landscape), improving surface 
water quality has been and still is the highest priority – also in the subsequent programmes 
(2000-2006, 2007-2013) that have only slightly fine-tuned the original programme.  
Finnish authorities expected that agri-environmental program could achieve about 30 – 
40% decrease of phosphorus and nitrogen runoff by 2010 (MMM 2003). Even more ambitious 
50%  nutrient  runoff  reduction  targets  by  2005  were  set  for  agriculture  in  the  Government 
resolution as regards surface water protection targets (YM 2000). Despite the ambitious goals 
and all efforts and support payments, something has gone wrong, however. No actual reductions 
in  measured/monitored  nutrient  runoff  can  be  observed  and  especially  nitrogen  runoff  is 
reported to have increased. Clearly, a theory-guided analysis of the water protection policy in 
agriculture is needed to evaluate the impacts of the water protection policy and to find an 
explanation for the observed no-progress in actual nutrient loads. To examine the performance 
of  agri-environmental  policy,  we  develop  theoretically  and  employ  empirically  two  basic 
counterfactuals.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  our  theoretical 
framework and section 3 presents an empirical framework. Results are presented in section 4 
and concluding section 5 ends the paper.  
2.  THE FRAMEWORK: A COUNTERFACTUAL APPROACH   
Consider an introduction of a new agri-environmental policy, A, starting a period t = T. 
This ends the previous policy regime, which can be no policy (free market solution), or some 
other policy denoted by B.  Now, let  0 x   A x  and  B x  denote the vector of instruments of no 
policy  intervention  and  policies  A  and  B,  respectively.  For  no  policy  intervention,  this 
instrument set is naturally equal to zero,  { } 0 0 = x . To keep the presentation simple, policy 
instruments under policy A are a fertilizer application constraint (
A l ), a buffer strip requirement 
(m ), the CAP area payment (a) and the environmental support payment per hectare (b), that is, 
{ } b a m l x
A A , , , = . Furthermore, the previous policy regime B is assumed to consist of direct 
price support (s) and a requirement for large set-aside areas (E), that is,  { } E s x
B , = . Ancona - 122
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The farmers optimize their agricultural profits subject to exogenous variables and the  
policy instruments under each policy regime. Denote the conventional response function of crop 
i as  ) ( i i l f y =  with  0 ) ( > ¢ i i l f  but  0 ) ( < ¢ ¢ i l l f . Let  i p  be the price of the crop and c the price 
of fertilizer input, and  i L  be the amount of land allocated to each crop under the three policies. 
Market  parameters  alone  or  together  with  the  instruments  under  policy  regimes  A  and  B 
determine the optimal use of inputs and land allocation (including entry and exit of land in 
agricultural sector). We next develop the farmers choices under each policy regime. 
Under no policy intervention (denoted by supersrcpt 0), the profits of a given parcel 
allocated to crop i are given by  c l f p i i i i - = ) (
0 p , and profits from the land area allocated to 
crop i by 
0 0
i i i L r p = . The optimal solution entails  ) , (
0 c p l i i  and  ) , , (
0
j i i p c p L , where  j p  
refers to prices of the other crops and 
0
1






0 L  refers to overall land in 
cultivation in the no-policy regime.  
Under  the  new  policy  regime  A  the  per  parcel  profits  are  given  by 
[ ] b a cl l f p m i i i i
A
i + + - - = ) ( ) 1 ( p  subject to  i
A
i l l £ . At the optimal solution output price 
and  fertlizer  cost  no  longer  impact  fertilizer  intensity,  because  the  fertilizer  application 
constraint is binding ( i
A
i l l = ); also the buffer strip is mandated 
A A m m = . Using these two 
mandatory figures, the overall amount of fertilizer applied to each hectare is  i
A
i l m l ) 1 ( - = . 
Land allocation, however, continues to depend on the relative profitability of each crop, and 
thereby it depends on prices, so that  ) , , , , ( b a p c p L j i
A
i , where a refers to CAP compensation 
payment and b refers to area-based environmental support payment. The overall profits are then 












i L b a c p p L = ∑
=
) , , , , (
1
,  where 
A L   refers  to  overall  land  in 
cultivation in the policy regime A.  
Under the previous policy B the per parcel and total profits for land in cultivation are 
given  by  c l f s p i i i
B






i L r p = ,  respectively.  The  optimal  fertilizer 
intensity is a function of crop price, fertilizer price and price support,   ) , , ( c s p l i
B
i and land 




i = . For 





i L E L = + ∑
=1
, where 
B L  refers to overall 
amount of land in cultivation in the policy regime B (recall E is the mandatory fallow area).  
 The environmental quality is a function of the input use, the amount of cultivated arable 
land, and its allocation between the crops. Let function G represent the way the use of inputs in 
agriculture transform to environmental quality, nutrient runoff in our case. Then, drawing on the Ancona - 122
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above discussion environmental quality can be expressed for our three cases as a function of 
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Recall, our aim is to assess the performance of the new agri-environmental policy A. Let 
A G  be 
the announced environmental target of the new policy; in our case reduction in nutrient loads, 
while the observed environmental quality under this policy is 
A G . Naturally , the difference 
between the goal and the actually measured nutrient runoff, 
A A G G - , can be any sign and due 
to multiple reasons. The challenge of the counterfactual analysis is to explain this difference. 
We can now use the above analysis to formulate our two counterfactuals, which recall, 
were the following.  What would have happened to 
A G  if the land allocation between crops and 
green  set-aside  would  not  have  changed  from  policy  regime  B?  Second,  what  would  have 
happened  to 
A G   if  no  voluntary  agri-environmental  policy  would  have  taken  place  when 
Finland joined the EU? Economic mechanisms present in (2) and (3) readily suggest how to 
formalize these counterfactuals (CF): 
 
) ) , , , ( (
1
1







CF e + = ∑
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CF         (5) 
 
Taking the difference  1 CF G
A -  and  2 CF G
A -  allows us evaluate the relative role of input 
use intensities and land use changes of the agri-environmental policy regime A. Counterfactual 
1 CF   allows  us  to  define  the  unit  effectiveness  of  the  instruments  in  policy  regime  A  and 
counterfactual  2 CF  in turn defines the preventive impact of the policy A on nutrient loads. In 
the  empirical  part  we  also  consider  the  role  of  some  fine  tunings  of  policy  regime  A  on 
environmental  impacts;  they  are  our  minor  counterfactuals  that  are  developed  in  a  similar 
fashion as (4) and (5).  Ancona - 122
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3.  EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1. Crop yield response to fertilizer 
Per hectare crop yield is modelled as a function of nitrogen fertilization. By assumption, 
farmers use a compound fertilizer that contains nitrogen and phosphorus in fixed proportions 
and in the absence of constraints choose the application rate of fertilizer on the basis of yield 
response to nitrogen application. The crop yield function for spring wheat, barley, and oats is 







- - =                 (6) 
 
where yi is yield per hectare, Ni is nitrogen use per hectare, and  i, σi and νi are parameters. 
These  parameters  are  estimated  by  Bäckman  et  al.  (1997)  on  the  basis  of  Finnish  field 
experiments. The yield function for rape, silage and hay is assumed to have the quadratic form  
 
2
i i i i i i N N A y g c + + =               (7) 
 
where yi is yield per hectare, Ni is nitrogen use per hectare, and Ai, χi and γi are parameters.  
Parameters for rape have been estimated by Pietola et al. (1999) and parameters for silage and 
dry hay are based on Lehtonen (2001).  
3.2. Optimal fertilizer use 
Farmer’s  short-run  restricted  profits  π
i  are  given  by  equation  (8a)  for  spring  wheat, 
barley, and oats and by equation (8b) for rape, silage and hay.  




i N c e p
i i - - =
- ) 1 (
n s m p             (8a) 
i i i i i i i i
i N c N N A p - + + = ) (
2 g c p             (8b) 
 
Where π
i is farmers’ per hectare profits, pi is output price for a given crop (i) and ci is nitrogen 
price for a given combined fertilizer (NPK). Optimal nitrogen application level can be solved by 
taking first-order conditions with respect to nitrogen application N and setting them to equal 
zero and then solving for optimal N.  
3.3. Nutrient runoff 
The modeling of nutrient runoff follows Lankoski et al. (2006) who modeled nitrogen 
and phosphorus runoff on the basis of Finnish data. In the case of phosphorus runoff two forms 
are distinguished: (i) dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP) and (ii) particulate phosphorus (PP). 
As already noted, farmers use a compound fertilizer (NPK) and because these main nutrients are Ancona - 122
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in  fixed  proportions,  nitrogen  fertilizer  intensity  determines  also  the  amount of  phosphorus 
used. Part of this phosphorus is taken up by the crop, while the rest accumulates and builds up 
soil P. The concentration of dissolved phosphorus in surface runoff is found to depend linearly 
on the easily soluble soil P, and the runoff of particulate phosphorus depends on the rate of soil 
erosion  and  the  P  content  of  eroded  soil  material.  The  following  nitrogen  runoff  function 
(Simmelsgaard 1991) is employed, 
 
) exp( 0 i i
i




N Z   =  nitrogen  runoff  at  fertilizer  intensity  level  Ni,  kg/ha,  i f   =  nitrogen  runoff  at 
average nitrogen use,  0 0 < b  and  0 > b  are constants and Ni = nitrogen fertilization in relation 
to the normal fertilizer intensity for the crop, 0.5 £ N £ 1.5. This runoff function represents 
nitrogen runoff generated by a nitrogen application rate of Ni  per hectare and the parameter  i f  
reflects differences in crops.   
In the case of phosphorus, both dissolved and particulate runoff is modeled. Drawing on 
Finnish experiments (e.g. Saarela et al. 1995) it is assumed that 1 kg increase in soil phosphorus 
reserve increases the soil P status (i.e., ammonium acetate-extractable P) by 0.01 mg/l soil. 
Uusitalo and Jansson (2002) estimated the following linear equation between soil P and the 
concentration of dissolved phosphorus (DRP) in runoff: water soluble P in runoff (mg/l) = 
0.021*soil_P  (mg/l  soil)  –  0.015  (mg/l).  The  surface  runoff  of  potentially  bioavailable 
particulate  phosphorus  is  approximated  from  the  rate  of  soil  loss  and  the  concentration  of 
potentially bioavailable phosphorus in eroded soil material as follows: potentially bioavailable 
particulate phosphorus PP (mg/kg eroded soil) = 250 * ln [soil_P (mg/l soil)]-150 (Uusitalo 
2004). Thus, the parametric description of surface phosphorus runoff is given by 
 
100 / ] 015 . 0 ) * 01 . 0 ( 021 . 0 ( [ - + F = i i i
i
DRP P Z y v         (10a) 
6 10 * }] 150 ) * 01 . 0 ln( 250 { [
- - + F D = i i i
i
PP P Z z         (10b) 
 
where  i y  is runoff volume (mm), Φ is soil_P (common to all crops) and ζi is erosion kg/ha, and 
Pi is the phosphorus application rate. As in the case of nitrogen, the crop, soil textural class and 
field  slope  based  differences  in  the  runoff  of  dissolved  and  the  potentially  bioavailable 
particulate phosphorus are captured by parameters  i v  and  i D , respectively. Soil_ P is fixed at 
12.6 mg/l in 1995, 11.6 mg/l in 2001 and 10.6 mg/l in 2007 on the basis of the average for 
Finnish soil test samples taken on those respective years (MMM 2003 and Myyrä et al. 2005).  
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4.  DATA AND NUTRIENT RUNOFF UNDER FINNISH AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME  
Following the theory, we develop the empirical counterparts for equations (4) and (5).  
Data is needed on land allocation, fertilizer application intensities and nutrient runoff. Data on 
the development of actual land-use and its allocation between the main crops is given by farm 
staticstics;  for  our  counterfactuals  the  actual  land  allocation  represents  revealed  profit 
maximization by farmers. Another given data are fertilizer restrictions of the agri-environmental 
program during the years 1995-2007. Using annual crop and fertilizer prices we solve privately 
optimal fertilizer application level in the case where no agri-environmental program would have 
been implemented. Similarly nutrient runoff (both nitrogen and phosphorus) is estimated by 
using this modeling approach. 
4.1. Data on land use and fertilizer application  
Table 1 shows the land use between the main crops in 1994 (just before the beginning of 
current policy) and during the agri-environmental program. We present the land area of those 
crops that are external to the analysis under the land use class “Other”. It includes crops, such as 
sugar beet, potatoes, and peas. 
 
Table 1. Land use (ha) in 1994, 1995, 2001, and 2007 (Yearbook of Farm Statistics). 
 Land use  1994  1995  2001  2007 
Wheat  77 600  88 100  115 400  167 900 
Barley  505 700  516 200  547 200  550 100 
Oats  334 300  329 300  422 700  361 500 
Rape  67 200  85 300  73 100  90 200 
Hay  257 900  287 100  157 500  103 100 
Silage  268 400  300 900  380 900  438 100 
Fallow  505 100  223 200  201 900  121 200 
Other  285 700  316 300  293 200  423 200 
Total  2 301 900  2 146 400  2 191 900  2 255 300 
 
Table 1 shows that during the agri-environmental program periods (1995 – 2007) the total 
cultivated land increased by 2.1% from 1995 to 2001 and 5.1% from 1995 to 2007 in Finland. 
Also  land  allocation  between  different  crops  has  changed  much.  Land  allocation  to  wheat 
cultivation has increased from 4.8% to 8.6% between 1995 and 2007. The share of barley, oats 
and rape has remained quite stable while land allocated to hay has decreased from 15.7% to 
5.3% and land allocated to silage increased from 16.4% to 22.6%. Thus, there has been a clear 
shift in land use towards more fertilizer intensive crops wheat and silage.  
Table 2 presents the actual fertilization constraints and the fertilizer intensity under the 
hypothetical case, in which farmers optimize on the basis of market prices only and do not 
participate in the agri-environmental programme (labeled as “N private”). We do not distinguish 
between manure and chemical fertilizer application. Nitrogen applied can be a combination 
manure and chemical nitrogen or from chemical nitrogen only.  Ancona - 122
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Table  2.  Optimal  nitrogen  use  intensity  and  nitrogen  application  constraint  in  agri-
environmental program in 1995, 2001, and 2007.   
1995  2001  2007   
Crop  N  
private 
N constraint  N  
private  
N constraint  N  
private 
 N constraint 
Wheat  155.3  100  140.4  100  158.8  120 
Barley  122.1  90  112.1  90  123.3  100 
Oats  97.9  90  92.2  90  94.2  100 
Rape  156.3  100  147.3  100  137.2  110 
Silage  161.6  180  199.3  180  255.6  240 
Hay  128.0  90  133.4  90  176.6  100 
 
Table 2 shows that for most crops the nitrogen application constraint has been binding 
throughout program years. For wheat, rape and hay the economically optimal application rate 
has been clearly higher than the constraint, while in the case of oats farmers’ economic optimum 
and nitrogen use constraint are sufficiently close to each other.  
4.2. Estimating nutrient runoff under the agri-environmental programme 
We  estimate  the  average  per  hectare  nitrogen  and  phosphorus  runoff  by  employing 
equations (9) – (10b) for each crop. Total nutrient runoff for each crop is obtained through 
multiplying the average runoff by the total land area allocated to each crop.  
 
Table 3. Nitrogen, dissolved phosphorus (DRP) and particulate phosphorus (PP) runoff, kg/ha, 
under constrained fertilizer use intensity in 1995, 2001, and 2007. 
1995  2001  2007 
Crop 
N  DRP  PP  N  DRP  PP  N  DRP  PP 
Wheat  14.0  0.376  0.479  14.0  0.347  0.462  16.1  0.319  0.444 
Barley  13.1  0.376  0.479  13.1  0.347  0.462  14.0  0.319  0.444 
Oats  13.1  0.376  0.479  13.1  0.343  0.459  13.5  0.312  0.438 
Rape  14.0  0.356  0.467  14.0  0.347  0.462  15.0  0.319  0.444 
Silage  7.3  0.585  0.175  8.2  0.534  0.168  12.4  0.506  0.164 
Hay  4.5  0.526  0.166  4.5  0.481  0.160  4.8  0.447  0.154 
Fallow  5.4  0.461  0.280  5.4  0.407  0.280  5.4  0.373  0.280 
Other  9.7  0.671  0.182  10.4  0.636  0.182  12.6  0.602  0.182 
 
The  most  alarming  feature  in  Table  3  is  that  due  to  the  relaxation  of  the  nitrogen 
application constraints, the last phase of the program witnesses the highest per hectare nitrogen 
runoff.  In  contrast  to  this  per  hectare  runoff  of  particulate  and  dissolved  phosphorus  has 
diminished steadily over time due to the decrease in soil phosphorus. Hence, the total load of 
phosphorus per hectare has decreased.  
Table 4 combines the observed land allocation between the crops and the estimated per 
hectare average nutrient runoff to produce total nitrogen and phosphorus runoff in tons in 1995, Ancona - 122
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2001, and 2007 under the Finnish Agri-Environmental Programme.  In terms  of our theory, 
Table 4 corresponds to equation (2). 
 
Table 4. Total nitrogen and phosphorus runoff (tons) under constrained fertilizer use in 
1995, 2001, and 2007. 
1995  2001  2007   
Crop  N   P   N   P   N   P  
Wheat  1894  97  2481  121  4151  166 
Barley  10347  568  10969  572  11825  544 
Oats  6601  362  8473  438  7461  352 
Rape  1834  91  1571  76  2079  89 
Silage  3391  257  4883  301  8544  332 
Hay  1962  224  1076  114  756  70 
Fallow  1129  155  1021  130  613  74 
Other  4693  303  4705  271  8184  376 
Total  31 851  2056  35 180  2024  43 613  2003 
 
The time path of the nitrogen load shows that despite all efforts, nitrogen runoff has 
increased during all three phases of the program. Recall that the per hectare nitrogen runoff was 
the same in 1995 and 2001 for all crops with one exception. Therefore, it is the shift of arable 
land to more fertilizer intensive crops, such as wheat and silage that increased nitrogen runoff 
during the second phase of the agri-environmental program. This tendency is re-enforced by the 
relaxed  nitrogen  constraint  during  the  third  phase.  The  development  of  phosphorus  runoff 
follows  a  different  path  since  the  gradual  decrease  of  soil  phosphorus  content  decreases 
phosphorus runoff in the second and third phase of the program. Thus, nutrient loading evolves 
to  opposite  directions;  the  reason  is  that  phosphorus  application  is  roughly  constant  across 
crops, while nitrogen application varies considerably between crops. We can clearly conclude 
that the Finnish Agri-Environmental Programme has failed to reduce nitrogen loading to inland 
waters and the Baltic Sea.  
5.  THE IMPACTS OF THE FINNISH AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME ON NUTRIENT 
RUNOFF: A COUNTERFACTUAL APPROACH   
We now turn to the counterfactual analysis. We first assess the effectiveness of the key 
policy instruments, fertilizer application constraints and mandatory buffer strips, in reducing 
nutrient runoff. This can be made by isolating the impacts of these intensive margin instruments 
from  changes  taking  place  in  the  extensive  margin  that  is  land  allocation,  as  equation  (4) 
suggest. This helps us to answer the question whether the key instruments have been effective 
or not. We follow then equation (5) to trace out how much the agri-environmental program has 
potentially offset nutrient runoff relative to the non-regulated market-based development. Ancona - 122
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5.1. The effectiveness of instruments targeting nutrient runoff 
In Table 5 we examine what would have happened to nutrient loads if agricultural land 
use would not have changed over the years but would have stayed as it was either in 1994 or 
1995. Taking the difference between this and the actual loads under the current policy regime, 
which  is  called  the  Baseline  indicates  the  importance  of  controlling  both  entry-exit  (total 
amount of arable land) and extensive (land allocation) margins in addition to intensive margin 
(fertilizer use intensity and buffer strips).   
  
Table 5. Total nitrogen and phosphorus runoff (tons) under constrained fertilizer use in 
Baseline and in the case of total cultivated land and its allocation fixed to correspond to that of 
1994 or 1995.   
1995  2001  2007  Land 
allocation  N   P   N   P   N   P  
Baseline  31 851  2056  35 180  2024  43 613  2003 
Fixed 1995  31 851  2056  32 398  1938  36 519  1833 
Fixed 1994  29 056  1982  29 499  1864  32 915  1764 
 
Table 5 reveals that under either 1995 or 1994 land allocation total nitrogen load would 
have increased much less and phosphorus load decrease much more than they actually did. 
Under 1995 land allocation, decrease in phosphorus runoff by 2007 would have been 223 tons 
and under 1994 land allocation 218 tons, making 11.0% and 10.8% reduction of nutrient loads. 
Given that the phosphorus fertilization limit has been the same over all three periods, these 
figures indicate the true impact of phosphorus limits on loads that is purified from the changes 
in land allocation. Due to changes in land allocation, the actual decrease in phosphorus loads 
was 53 tons only, representing 2.6% reduction. The difference of these two figures, 165–170 
tons, represents simply the increase in total phosphorus load due to the increased land area in 
cultivation. 
During the years 1995 – 2007 nitrogen loads would have increased by 4668 tons (14.7%) 
under 1995 land allocation and by 3859 tons (13.3%) under 1994 land allocation. Contrast this 
to the actual increase in nitrogen loads that was 11 762 tons (36.9%). The increase in actual 
loads is explained by two factors: nitrogen fertilization constraints were relaxed in the third 
programme period (year 2007); and the amount of cultivated land has increased and more land 
is  allocated  to  more  nitrogen  intensive  crops.  The  relaxed  nitrogen  fertilization  constraints 
increased nitrogen loads by 5753 tons in the baseline, representing 48.9% of the total load 
increase, relative to a situation where constraints would not have been relaxed. Consequently we 
can conclude that the impact of the increase in the amount of cultivated land and land allocation 
change towards more nitrogen intensive crops was 6009 tons, representing 51.1% of the load 
increase. Table 5 reveals how important role the total amount of land in cultivation (entry-exit 
margin) and land allocation between the crops (extensive margin) play in determining total 
nutrient loading from agriculture. Ancona - 122
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5.2. Preventive impact of the Finnish Agri-Environmental Programme 
Let us ask next what would have happened without the program when the farmers are 
allowed to choose their fertilizer application rates freely on the basis of crop and fertilizer 
prices. This is our second counterfactual that is defined by equation (5). To answer the question, 
one must solve nutrient runoff per hectare under market solution and link this to land allocation 
between the crops.  
Table 6 provides information on nutrient loads under both cases. The difference between 
the two figures indicates how much the Finnish Agri-Environmental Programme has prevented 
nutrients loads by its presence in each program phase. 
 
Table 6. Total nitrogen and phosphorus runoff (tons) under constrained and free private 
fertilizer use in 1995, 2001, and 2007.   
1995  2001  2007   
  N   P   N   P   N   P  
Constraint  31 851  2056  35 180  2024  43 613  2003 
Private  39 083  2164  41 348  2105  51 418  2126 
Difference  - 7232  - 108  - 6168  - 81  - 7805  - 123  
 
As Table 6 reveals, the preventive effect of the Finnish Agri-Environmental Programme 
has been on average 7068 tons of nitrogen and 104 tons of phosphorus. Combining Table 6 with 
Table  5  allows  us  to  make  the  following  conclusion.  The  Programme  has  been  somewhat 
successful in the intensive margin but this success has been outweighted by a failure to control 
both extensive margin (land allocation) as well as entry-exit margin (total amount of cultivated 
land). Consequently, nitrogen loads have increased and phosphorus loads have decreased less 
than expected.  
6.  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF WATER PROTECTION POLICY IN THE FINNISH AGRI-
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME  
We end the analysis by asking whether the benefits from water quality policy in the 
Finnish  agri-environmental  programme  exceed  the  costs,  or  not.  Costs  of  the  policy  is  the 
overall  amount  of  annual  support  payments  to  farmers  targeted  to  water  quality,  while  the 
benefits are given by the reduced nutrient runoff damages. Reductions in nutrient loads reduce 
damages both in inland waters and in the Baltic Sea. As the main goal is to improve the state of 
the Baltic Sea, we express phosphorus loads as nitrogen equivalent using the Redfield ratio 7.2. 
The Redfield ratio describes the optimum N/P ratio for the growth of phytoplankton, relevant 
for algal growth in sea waters. The marginal damage from nitrogen equivalents is assumed 
constant, so that the damage function is given by  
 
) 2 . 7 ( ) ( i i n
i P N R Z d + = ,             (11) 
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where Rn is the constant social marginal damage. Drawing on Gren (2001), the willingness to 
pay for nutrient load reduction in the Baltic Sea is set to be Rn  = € 6.70/kg of N equivalent. 
Hence, this estimate provides social value of reductions in nutrient runoff. As regards social 
costs of nutrient runoff reduction we use the budget allocated to water protection measures in 
the  agri-environmental  program  as  a  primary  measure  of  social  costs  of  nutrient  runoff 
reduction.  
Also, we report a more developed social net benefit estimate by including the policy 
related transaction costs (PRTCs) to the social costs. Our estimate of policy related transaction 
costs of agri-environmental support is based on Ollikainen et al. (2008) who estimated that the 
PRTCs of Basic measure support (including fertilizer use constraints and buffer strips) are 1.5% 
of the total transfer. Finally, the most comprehensive social net-benefit estimate takes also into 
account the so-called marginal cost of taxation (marginal cost of public funds) as a measure of 
economic welfare losses due to raising government revenue with distortionary taxes (such as 
labor taxes). We employ 10% of the total transfer as our estimate of marginal cost of taxation.   
Finally, for the purposes of comparison we provide a hypothetical case assuming that 
only compliance costs were compensated to farmer. A crude estimation of compliance costs of 
implementing the program is measured as forgone profits when a farmer complies with fertilizer 
use constraints and buffer strip establishment. Thus, profits forgone show the minimum level 
required for compensation payment.    
Table  7  provides  the  three  estimates  of  the  social  net  benefits  for  the  Finnish  Agri-
Environmental Scheme and the net benefits from hypothetical case where only compliance costs 
are compensated, that is there is no overcompensation.  
 
Table 7.  Social net-benefits of agri-environmental program  
  1995  2001  2007 
Social net benefits of the agri-environmental program 
N-eq reduction, tons  3343   1775  2885 
Program outlays, million €  229.6  233.1  276.0 
Value of damage reduction, million €  22.4  11.9  19.3 
Net benefit, million €  -207.2  -221.2  -256.7 
Transaction costs (TC), million €  3.4  3.4  4.0 
Net benefit - TCs, million €   -210.5  -224.6  -260.7 
Net benefit – TCs - MCT, million €   -233.5  -247.9  -288.3 
Social net benefits if only compliance costs were compensated 
N-eq reduction, tons  8011  6754  8686 
Profit forgone, million €  -24.1  -12.0  -27.7 
Net benefits, million €   29.6  33.2  30.5 
 
Table 7 reveals that the social net benefit of the programme is negative in every program 
period under all three net benefit measures. This clearly refers to overcompensation of farmers’ 
compliance costs, that is part of the environmental support payments seem to entail farm income 
support. This can also be verified in the lower part of Table 7, where the direct compliance costs Ancona - 122
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(i.e. short-run profit forgone) are estimated. The estimated compliance costs vary over time as a 
function of crop prices and cultivation costs. These direct costs are quite low relative to the 
environmental  payments,  because  they  underestimate  the  long-run  cost  burden  on  farmers. 
However, even if these costs were doubled or tripled they would still remain relatively small in 
comparison to program outlays.  
The  lower  part  of  Table  7  also  illustrates  what  the  benefits  would  have  been  if  the 
Progamme compensated only compliance costs. In this case entry of cultivated land due to 
Progamme would have been zero and the reduction of nitrogen equivalents more than double.  
This would have made the social net benefits of the program positive with a wide margin of 30 
million euros.     
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS    
We developed a theoretical framework using the interlinkages between the behaviour of 
agents and the response of environmental systems to the economic decisions. We applied our 
model to agricultural water protection policy of the Finnish Agri-Environmental Programme, 
which  aims  at  reducing  nutrient  runoff from  arable  lands to  the  Baltic  Sea. Counterfactual 
analysis allowed us to examine both the unit effectiveness of the measures included in the 
Programme and its preventive impact.  
We find that the Finnish agri-environmental programme has failed to achieve its goals: 
nitrogen  loads  have  increased  and  phosphorus  loads  have  decreased  only  slightly.  Our 
counterfactuals help to trace out the mechanisms leading to this failure. This is not to say that 
the Finnish Agri-Environmental Programme would have failed entirely. We demonstrated that 
the  loads  of  both  nutrients  would  have  been  much  higher  if  no  policies  would  have  been 
implemented. The social cost-benefit analysis of the program showed, nevertheless, strongly 
negative net benefits. Thus, there is a lot of scope for improving the agri-enviromental water 
protection policies.  
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